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tendent. 52 8 The court stated that "[a]voidance of salary compression as a rationale for agency action in witholding salary increases has been upheld as a legitimate exercise of managerial
prerogative .
. ".
-529 However, the appellate division in
Margolis viewed the issue of salary compression as a triable issue
based on the "cogent" argument of petitioner that, in his case,
salary compression may factually be a sham or a ploy used to
force petitioner to retire early. This would afford the TA the
opportunity "to implement its policy of attrition for trainmasters." 53 0 Thus, in addition to reversing the lower court and reinstating Margolis' petition, the appellate division also granted petitioner's application to depose the TA employees. 53 1
The use of the rational basis test in the determination of an
equal protection claim involving social or economic matters is the
same under both the federal and state constitutions. 5 32
SECOND DEPARTMENT

Long Island Lighting Co. v. Assessor of Brookhaven5 33
(decided March 2, 1990)

Long Island Lighting Company (LILCO), a private utility
company, claimed that its equal protection and due process rights
under the federal and state constitutions were violated by a New
York State statute5 34 that precluded judicial review of whether
528. Margolis, 157 A.D.2d at 242, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 714. "Salary
compression occurs when the Legislature enacts legislation which increases
lower-level employee salaries but does not concomitantly enact legislation to
increase the salaries of agency heads, with the result that lower-level
employees' salaries are almost equal to, or higher than, those of their
supervisors." Shattenkirk v. Finnerty, 97 A.D.2d 51, 55, 471 N.Y.S.2d 149,
153 (3d Dep't 1983)).

529. Margolis, 157 A.D.2d at 242, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 714 (citing
Shattenkirk v. Finnerty, 97 A.D.2d 51, 471 N.Y.S.2d 149 (3d Dep't 1983)).
530. 157 A.D.2d at 242-43, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 714.
531. Id. at 243, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 714-15.

532. For a discussion of equal protection jurisprudence under the Federal
Constitution see supra notes 454-57 and accompanying text.
533. 154 A.D.2d 188, 552 N.Y.S.2d 336 (2d Dep't 1990).
534. N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 1020-q (McKinney Supp. 1991).
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tax assessments on the company's nuclear power plant were
excessive when all other property owners were entitled to such
review. The appellate court held for LILCO on both claims. 5 35
The court found that the statute was unconstitutional as applied
to LILCO under both state5 36 and federal5 37 equal protection
provisions because the legislature failed to provide a rational reason for excluding LILCO from judicial review of a tax assessment. 5 38 The court also found that the statute was violative of
539
LILCO's substantive due process rights under both the state
and federal 540 constitutions because it arbitrarily restricted the
54 1
company's right to judicial review.
The statute challenged by LILCO was section 1020-q(3) of the
state's Public Authorities Law (LIPA Act). This statute provides
that "[n]o municipality or governmental subdivision, including a
school district or special district, shall be liable to the authority or
any other entity for a refund of property taxes originally assessed
against the Shoreham plant. "542 This statute is part of the Long
Island Power Authority Act of 1986 that was enacted by the state
legislature to provide the residents of Long Island "an adequate
supply of gas and electricity in a reliable, efficient and economic
manner. '"543 To accomplish this goal, the Long Island Power
Authority (LIPA) "create[d] a publicly owned power authority
535. LILCO, 154 A.D.2d at 195-96, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 341. The right of a
taxpayer to seek judicial review in regard to a tax dispute is derived from
article 7 of the state's Real Property Tax Law. Id.; see N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX
LAW § 700 (McKinney 1984).
536. Id. at 194, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 340; see N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11.
537. LILCO, 154 A.D.2d at 194, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 340; see U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
538. LILCO, 154 A.D.2d at 195, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 340.
539. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
540. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
541. LILCO, 154 A.D.2d at 195-96, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 341. While
arbitrarily restricting the right to judicial review to contest the collection of a
tax assessment seems to implicate a procedural due process violation, it is
unclear how the lack of such an opportunity results in a deprivation of a
substantive due process right.
542. N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 1020-q(3) (McKinney 1991).
543. LILCO, 154 A.D.2d at 190, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 337 (quoting N.Y. PUB.
AUTH. LAW § 1020-h(1)(n) (McKinney Supp. 1991)).
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which could acquire any or all of the stock or assets of the Long
Island Lighting Company ..
.,,544 In 1989, the authority
acquired the Shoreham nuclear power plant from LILCO. 545
Prior to LIPA's acquisition of the Shoreham nuclear power
plant, LILCO was assessed property taxes by the Town of
Brookhaven, the township in which the plant was located. LILCO
contended that the tax assessments by the town assessor on its
plant were "excessive, unequal and unlawful." 546 The company
claimed a refund in excess of 400 million dollars from overpayment of property taxes made during the tax years of 1976-1977
through 1978-1979 and 1980-1981 through 1986-1987. Fearing
potential liability for a tax refund, the Shoreham-Wading River
School District received permission to intervene in the proceeding
and join with the Town of Brookhaven as a co-defendant. 547
In a motion for summary judgment, the defendants claimed that
a dispute of any over-assessment of property taxes was precluded
by section 1020-q(3) because the clause "or any other entity"
was applicable to LILCO and thus, prevented the company from
asserting a tax claim. In response to defendants' claim, LILCO
conceded that the section applied to it, but disputed the validity of
the section itself, claiming that it was violative of the company's
equal protection and substantive due process rights provided under both the state and federal constitutions. 548 While the motion
was pending, LILCO commenced a separate action in federal
district court against Governor Cuomo and subsequent intervenors, the Town of Brookhaven and the Shoreham-Wading
River School District, alleging, inter alia, that the LIPA Act was
facially unconstitutional under both the state and federal
constitutions' equal protection and substantive due process
clauses. 5 49 In this action, the district court held for the defen544. Id.
545. This acquisition was the result of a settlement between New York
State's Governor Cuomo and LILCO. See Long Island Lighting Co. v.
Cuomo, 888 F.2d 230, 232 (2d Cir. 1988).
546. L&LCO, 154 A.D.2d at 190, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 337.
547. Id. at 190, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 337-38.
548. Id. at 192, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 338.
549. Id.
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dants, ruling that section 1020-q(3) was constitutional on it face
and that the provision did not apply to LILCO. 5 50
At the same time, LILCO and one of its shareholders brought a
third action in the Nassau County Supreme Court 55 1 seeking,
inter alia, a declaratory judgment that the LIPA Act is
unconstitutional. In this action, the court, relying on the federal
district court's determination that the LIPA Act does not facially
violate the Federal Constitution, held that the act was also not vi552
olative of the state constitution.
On the basis of the federal district court decision, the trial court
in the instant case denied summary judgment for the defendants.
The Town of Brookhaven and the Shoreham-Wading River
School District, however, disagreed with the trial court's decision
and appealed their denial of summary judgment to the appellate
court.
In a per curiam decision, the appellate court ruled that section
1020-q(3) is applicable to LILCO on the basis of the "plain
language of the statute and the clear intent of the
Legislature . . . . ,553 The court concluded, however, that the
statute as applied to LILCO was violative of the equal protection
and substantive due process provisions of both the state and
554
federal constitutions.
With regard to the equal protection claim, LILCO contended
that the court should examine the suspect statute under strict
scrutiny analysis. According to the court, under such analysis
"the government must establish that the deprivation of the
fundamental right is necessary to serve a compelling State
interest." 55 5 LILCO asserted that strict scrutiny analysis is
550. Id. at 191-92, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 338 (quoting Long Island Lighting Co.
v. Cuomo, 666 F. Supp. 370, 401-02 (N.D.N.Y. 1987), appeal dismissed,

judgment vacated in part, 888 F.2d 230, 234 (2d Cir. 1989)).
551. Id. at 192; 552 N.Y.S.2d at 339 (citing Long Island Light Co. v.
Long Island Power Auth., 138 Misc. 2d 745, 525 N.Y.S.2d 497 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1988)).
552. Long Island Lighting Co. v. Long Island Power Auth., 138 Misc. 2d
745, 753, 525 N.Y.S.2d 497, 503 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1988).
553. LILCO, 154 A.D.2d at 193, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 339.
554. Id.
555. Id. at 194, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 340 (citations omitted).
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proper because the statute denies the company the fundamental
right to seek judicial review. The court, however, declined to
rule whether judicial review is a fundamental right deserving
strict scrutiny and decided to follow the federal test enunciated in
the United States Supreme Court decision Western & Southern
Insurance Company v. Board of Equalization556 and concluded
that even under this less demanding rational basis test, the statute
was violative of the state and federal constitutions' guarantee of
7
equal protection under the law. 55
According to this test, "[tiaxing statutes, like other social and
economic legislation that neither classify on the basis of a suspect
class nor impair a fundamental right, must be upheld if the challenged classification is rationally related to achievement of a legitimate State purpose." 558 In the instant case, the court noted
that "[t]here must [be] a rational reason for treating LILCO, as
the owner of the Shoreham plant, differently from other taxpayers similarly situated, that is, the other taxpayers owning real
property located within the taxing district." 55 9 Applying this test,
the court found that the State's purpose of the law - to give
"assurance of... continued economic well-being to the residents
of the taxing district[] ' ' 5 60 -- was not a rational reason for

excluding LILCO from contesting a tax dispute. While not holding section 1020-q(3) unconstitutional on its face, the court held
that as applied to LILCO, the section violates the company's state
61
and federal equal protection rights. 5
In regard to LILCO's due process right under the state and
federal constitutions, the court noted that although the state
legislature has the authority to restrict the right to judicial

556. 451 U.S. 648 (1980).
557. LILCO, 154 A.D.2d at 194, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 340. The court noted
that "[t]he opportunity to commence tax certiorari proceedings... is one of
the vehicles through which this uniformity [of tax burden] is achieved." Id. at
195, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 341 (citations omitted).
558. Id. at 194, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 340 (citing Western, 451 U.S. at 657).
559. Id. at 195, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 340.
560. Id.
561. Id. at 195, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 341.
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review, 562 "it may not alter or restrict it arbitrarily." ' 563 In the
case at bar, the court found that section 1020-q(3) arbitrarily
restricted LILCO's right to seek judicial review, thus resulting in
a violation of the company's state and federal due process
rights.

564

In its decision, the court did not grant LILCO any additional
protection under the state constitution than is already guaranteed
under the equivalent federal provision. With regard to equal protection, the court noted that the state provision "is no broader in
coverage than its Federal counterpart.", 5 65 Similarly, the court
did not grant any additional protection for LILCO under the
state's substantive due process provision than is already provided
5 66
under the federal provision.

562. Id. at 195-96, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 341 (citing Logan v. Zimmerman
Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982); Slewett & Farber v. Board of Assessors, 80
A.D.2d 186, 438 N.Y.S.2d 544 (2d Dep't 1981), modified, 54 N.Y.2d 547,
430 N.E.2d 1294, 446 N.Y.S.2d 544 (1982)).
563. Id. at 196, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 341 (citing Colton v. Riccobono, 67
N.Y.2d 571, 496 N.E.2d 670, 505 N.Y.S.2d 581 (1986)).
564. Id. at 196, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 341.
565. Id. at 194 n. 4, 552 N.Y.S.2d 339-40 n.4 (citing Under 21, Catholic
Home Bureau for Dependant Children v. City of New York, 65 N.Y.2d 344,
360 n. 6, 482 N.E.2d 1, 7 n. 6, 492 N.Y.S.2d 522, n. 6 (1985)).
566. Implicit in its decision, the appellate court concluded section 1020-q(3)
was violative of the state and federal substantive due process provisions
because the state legislature failed to offer a rational reason for denying
LILCO access to ajudicial proceeding. Id. at 194, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 341 (citing
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982) (holding that the state
of Illinois' Fair Employment Practices Commission provision which required a
fact-finding conference to convene within 120 days to process an employment
discrimination claim was unconstitutional because it was not rationally related
to the state's purpose of the provision of expediting such disputes); Colton v.
Riccobono, 67 N.Y.2d 571, 496 N.E.2d 670, 505 N.Y.S.2d 581 (1986)
(noting that a medical malpractice provision which requires, before
adjudication, a panel to hear and evaluate evidence was rationally related to the
state's purpose of controlling medical malpractice insurance rates)).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol8/iss1/38

6

